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Abstract—Modeling the spread of infections on networks is a well-studied and important field of research. Most infection and diffusion
models require a real value or probability on the edges of the network as an input, but this is rarely available in real-life applications.
Our goal in this paper is to develop a general framework for this task. The general model works with the most widely used infection
models and is able to handle an arbitrary number of observations on such processes. The model is defined as a general optimization
task and a Particle Swarm heuristic is proposed to solve it. We evaluate the accuracy and speed of the proposed method on a high
variety of realistic infection scenarios.
Index Terms—Network problems, Epidemic modeling, Particle Swarm Optimization
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1 INTRODUCTION
Infection models are frequently used in many real-lifeapplications in sociology, economics and epidemics [29].
There is a large variety of models available for different ap-
plications, the most popular ones being the SI, SIR and SEIR
models and their variants [1], [9]. They are regularly used to
model infectious diseases [9], the spread of information and
behavior on social networks [17], or the spread of economic
events [3], [8], [10]. Some of the tasks associated with these
models include influence maximization, that is finding the
set of individuals yielding the largest expected infection
[19], [25], [28], or the prediction of a posteriori infection
values i.e. finding the probability of infection for all nodes of
the network [7]. Most infection models are network-based;
they assume a set of nodes and the connections between
them to be given. Most also assume a specific value to be
available on the links of the networks; these are called the
edge infection values and they represent the probability that
the infection spreads from one node to another.
A common challenge in the application of infection
models is the lack of information on the edge infection
values on the links of networks. Recently several authors
have proposed models to estimate these values. Many of
the models assume that the time stamps of the infection
for each node are given [13], [14], [15], [16], [22], [26], [27],
although some approaches do not require this property
[2], [5], [6]. The current estimation methods are based on
a variety of infection models [14], but most often the SIR
model is used [2], [15], [16], [22]. Most of these models were
developed independently of each other and most of them
take a different, often application specific approach to the
problem.
Our goal in this paper is to define and solve a general
model for the estimation of edge infection values of infection
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processes. We denote this task as the inverse infection task and
we propose the General Inverse Infection Model (GIIM) to
solve such tasks. There are four main features of the GIIM
that distinguish it from previous inverse infection modeling
approaches. The features are listed below, and subsequently
explained in further details.
1) The GIIM can account for an arbitrary number of
observations on the infection process.
2) The GIIM allows for flexibility in the type of obser-
vations provided as input.
3) The GIIM allows for flexibility in the underlying
infection model.
4) The GIIM allows for flexibility in the type of edge
estimation values.
An infection spreading process may be fully or partially
observable, and some approaches even consider it to be
non-observable. GIIM is able to handle an arbitrary number
of observations on such processes, enabling it to adapt to
the specific requirements of applications. In this paper we
experiment with the two extremes of this requirement. In
fully observed scenarios we know at exactly what time a
node was infected. In two-observation cases we can only
observe who was infected at the beginning and at the end.
Both fully observed and two-observation approaches and
any in between them can be naturally formulated in the
framework of GIIM.
Observations on the infection process might be available
in various forms, so the model should be flexible enough to
handle different forms of input data. Two types of observations
are investigated in this paper. The first one is based on the
common assumption where at a certain time step we know
which nodes were infected and which nodes were not. In the
second type of observation we have real values indicating
how likely it is for the nodes to become infected at a given
time step. We propose additional types of observations that
we plan to investigate in future work.
Another key contribution is the freedom to choose the
underlying infection model. Most of the existing models
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2are applicable for a single infection one, most often the
Independent Cascade (IC) model [19] or another variant
of SIR. In contrast GIIM makes the inverse infection tasks
independent of the infection model. We show that the IC, SI,
SIR, SEIR models can be used within the GIIM framework,
making GIIM compliant with most of the infection models
used in literature.
Lastly, the GIIM is able to directly estimate real edge
infection values, as well as functional forms which include
variables representative of vertex and edge attributes.
In this paper we evaluate the features of GIIM high-
lighted above using a large variety of artificial infection
scenarios. The scenarios differ by graph classes, size of the
underlying graphs, size of the outbreak, type of infection
models used and the type of performance evaluation. Ad-
ditionally, both fully and partially observed scenarios are
considered with real and binary observations. Our goal is
to analyze the behavior of GIIM on the above examples in
terms of general tractability of the tasks and the accuracy of
the predictions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2 we review some basic graph theoretic concepts and define
the used infection models. In the third section we introduce
the General Inverse Infection Model. We examine the vari-
ous types of observations used in the model, possible ways
to measure the goodness of the results and describe the
optimization method itself. We also discuss a special case
of the GIIM. In Section 4 we evaluate the performance of a
number of specific variations of the general model. First we
examine the tractability of the task on trees and directed
acyclic graphs, then we use a high variety of artificially
generated infection scenarios and complex networks to test
the accuracy of our model. Finally, the scalability of the
model is tested on large complex networks. We close our
discussion with a short description of some features of
GIIM, that are not investigated in this paper, present some
of the challenges posed in this study and discuss possible
ways to further expand the functionality of our model.
2 DEFINITIONS
The infection processes described in this paper take place on
graphs. We will denote graph G as G(V,E), were VG is the
vertex and EG is the edge set of G. By default we are going
to consider these graphs to be connected and undirected,
otherwise we will note it in the text. The infection models
require a real value we ∈ [0, 1], e ∈ E to be present on all
edges of the graph, these are known as the edge infection
probabilities. We will denote the surjective assignment of
edge infection probabilities to the edges as WG : E(G) 7→
[0, 1]. The task of inverse infection is the estimation of these
values.
2.1 Infection models
Among the most frequently used infection models present
in the literature are the IC, SI, SIR and SEIR models. These
processes are iterative; events take place in discrete time
steps, and the models terminate in finite steps.
Discrete infection models work by assigning states to the
vertices of the graph. Each vertex may only be in one state
at a given time, and all vertices must be in a state at all
times. The states of the above models are Susceptible (S),
Exposed (E), Infected (I) and Removed (R). The exposed
and infected states have discrete time periods attached to
them, we denote these as τe and τi. Infected nodes attempt
to infect susceptible neighboring nodes according to the
corresponding edge weight probability we. If successful, the
newly infected nodes transition into an exposed state for
τe iterations, after which they attempt to infect susceptible
neighbors for τi iterations, after which point they become
removed (dead or immune) and can no longer infect other
nodes. The models differ in complexity, the most complex
being the SEIR model, which has all of the above states; in
the SIR model τe = 0; in the IC model τe = 0 and τi = 1
and in the SI model τe = 0 and τi →∞. Correspondingly in
the IC, SI and SIR models the nodes are never in an exposed
state, and in the SI model the nodes are never removed, i.e.,
they may attempt to infect neighboring nodes indefinitely.
We illustrate the mechanics of the infection process on
the most general infection model, SEIR. Apart from the
network itself, the infection process of the SEIR model has
two inputs. The first being the assignment of edge infection
probabilities WG : E(G) 7→ [0, 1] for all edges. The second
being the set of initially infected nodesA0 ⊂ V . These nodes
are considered to be infected at the start of the process.
Let Ai ⊆ V be the set of nodes in the infected state in
iteration i. Each node u ∈ Ai tries to infect its susceptible
neighbors v according to wu,v , if the attempt is successful
v will begin its exposed period. If more than one node is
trying to infect v in the same iteration, the attempts are made
independently of each other in an arbitrary order within the
same iteration. Still in iteration i the status of infected nodes
change to removed if the difference between i and the time
of their infection becomes greater than τe+τi; exposed nodes
become infected when the difference becomes greater than
τe. If At = ∅ the process terminates in iteration t. In a finite
network the process always terminates in a finite number of
steps.
The other infection models behave similarly, with minor
differences. The SEIR infection processes take longer to
complete because the nodes have to spend time in an ex-
posed state before becoming infectious. Similarly, higher τi
corresponds to more infected nodes because there are more
opportunities to infect neighboring nodes. Finally, in the SI
model, given enough time, all vertices become infected with
a probability of one, if there is an initially infected node in
every connected component.
3 GENERAL INVERSE INFECTION FRAMEWORK
In order to estimate the edge infection probabilities in in-
verse infection tasks we propose and define the General
Inverse Infection Model (GIIM). The goal of GIIM is to
formulate the inverse infection task as a general optimiza-
tion problem by defining the inputs and outputs of such
tasks and describing the relationship between the infection
and inverse infection models. In this section we provide a
formal description of GIIM, illustrate how various inverse
infection tasks can be represented in it, and propose the
Particle Swarm Optimization method from [21] to compute
the edge infection probabilities.
3We assume that the underlying graph of the infection
task is known. We also assume that we have observations
on an infection process taking place on the network. The
observations on the infection process are given in the form
of ~ot ∈ O, where t ∈ T denotes a time stamp. Each ~ot assigns
an observation on the infection process at time step t to all
nodes of the network. Set O contains all observations and
set T contains all time stamps. At least two observations are
needed to provide a meaningful model, but otherwise the
number of observations required is not specified. The nature
of these observations will be defined in Section 3.1. Finally
we assume that we know the specific type of infection
process taking place on the network, although in Section
5 we will discuss what happens if we relax this assumption.
We define the inputs of GIIM as follows: we have an
unweighted graphG, an infection model I, the set of sample
times T and the observations on the infection process ~ot ∈ O
for all t ∈ T , where O = Inf(G,W, I, T ). We denote the
unknown weight assignment to the edges of the graph as
WG : E(G) 7→ [0, 1], and for now we assume I to be
any network based infection model from section 2.1. We
can interpret Inf as a procedure that makes observations
at time steps T on infection process I taking place on graph
G with edge weights we ∈ W , e ∈ E(G). We also define
a difference function d that compares two observations:
d(O1, O2). The way we count the difference depends on
the form of observations, for example if they are numerical
values a vector norm is a natural choice; more examples
will be provided in Section 3.2. The task of GIIM is to find
an estimation W ′ of W so that d(O,O′) between O and
O′ = Inf(G,W ′, I, T ) is as small as possible: we are looking
for an edge infection probability assignment, that best explains the
observations of the original process.
According to this, we define the General Inverse Infec-
tion Model:
General Inverse InfectionModel: Given an unweighted graph
G, and infection model I, the set of sample times T and ob-
servations O = Inf(G,W, I, T ), we seek the edge infection
probability assignment W ′ such that the difference d(O,O′)
between O and O′ = Inf(G,W ′, I, T ) is minimal.
The definition above defines the inverse infection task as
an optimization problem: the minimization of error between
a reference and a computed observation. The optimization
task itself would be an iterative refinement of the computed
observation. The solution procedure goes as follow: begin
with an initial weight configuration W ′0, run the infection
model, extract observations O′, compute the error between
O and O′, then refine W ′ and repeat the process until the
error is less than an accuracy constant a selected by the user.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the main components of GIIM.
The specific search strategy we implement in this paper
to refine W ′ is the Particle Swarm Optimization method
[21], but other methods may be selected if they follow the
structure above. It should be noted that the search process
can be easily implemented in a parallel way. Given multiple
candidate weight configurations, multiple infection models
can be computed independently of each other on multiple
threads. We discuss the optimization task in more detail in
section 3.3.
GIIM gives a general framework for inverse infection,
Algorithm 1 Generalized Inverse Infection Model
1: Inputs: G, I, T , O, a
2: Choose initial edge infection probability assignment W ′
3: repeat
4: Compute O′ = Inf(G,W ′, I, T )
5: Compute d(O,O′)
6: if d(O,O′) ≤ a then
7: returnW ′
8: else
9: Choose new W ′
10: end if
with many of the finer details intended to be application
specific. In this work our evaluation focuses on the general
performance under three flexible properties of the model:
the availability of observations, the type of observations,
and the type of underlying infection model. Two different
error functions are considered to quantify the model perfor-
mance. We also discuss possible applications for our model,
and provide a short description of extensions of our model
in Section 5.
3.1 Observations
In the definition aboveO is defined as a set of vectors ~ot ∈ O
for all t ∈ T , and each vector assigns an observation to
all vertices of the graph at a specific time step t. Since T
represents the set of sample times it is safe to assume that
it can be ordered, thus the set of observations can also be
ordered according to T .
The cardinality of T is not specified, but at least two
time samples are needed to make a meaningful prediction
for W . The upper limit is application dependent. In case of
a discrete time infection model, T usually contains natural
numbers, where the infection process starts at time i0 = 0. If
the infection model is finite, i.e. it finishes at iteration imax
it is meaningless to make observations after tmax = imax
because the process does not change after imax. Thinking in
the opposite way, the first and last observations – at t0 and
tmax respectively – also give bounds, since we do not have
other observations apart from the ones at T . Therefore if we
want to explain the witnessed infection scenario we should
consider t0 and tmax to be the beginning and the end of the
infection process. It is possible to predict the behavior of an
infection process beginning before t0 or ending after tmax;
we will investigate this in future work.
The task of GIIM is to find an edge weight configura-
tion that explains the original observed infection process.
Therefore, the set of observations O should contain informa-
tion that represents the behavior of nodes in the infection
process. In this paper we suggest two extreme cases of
observation levels, but the proposed framework is able to
handle other types as well, which we identify in Section 5.
1) Two observations are available at t0 = i0 and t1 =
tmax = imax.
2) Observations for all iterations of the discrete infec-
tion process are available T : {t0 = i0, . . . , tmax =
imax}.
Realistic cases may be in between these two extremes,
all of which can be accommodated within the modeling
4framework. We will investigate the relationship between the
number of available observations and the accuracy of the
estimation in Section 4.
The set of observations O should contain information
that represents the behavior of nodes in the infection pro-
cess. In this paper we suggest two specific types of observa-
tions that can be made; the proposed framework is able to
handle other types as well, which we will discuss in Section
5.
The first observation type defines the observations as
real values between 0 and 1, which are assigned to each
node at the time steps where observations are available.
For a time step t and node v the value ovt represents the
likelihood that node v is infected at time step t i.e. the
cumulative infection probability of v up to time step t, while
~ot represents the vector of observations for all nodes at time
step t. The initial infections, the probability that v ∈ V (G)
is infected before the process, are stored in ~ot0 , while the
probability that a node becomes infected measured at the
end of the process are in ~otmax , corresponding to the a priori
and a posteriori distributions assumed known in the first
case. For finite infection models, if we limit our viewpoint
to a single node, the series of observations, ovt will be a
monotonically increasing function since the ovt starts at the
initial infection probability ov0 and the infection process
may never decrease this value.
Another way to make observations is to simply consider
flags on the nodes signaling whether they have been in-
fected or not. In this case, for a node v ∈ V (G), ovt = 0
indicates it has not been infected up to time step t, and
ovt = 1 means it is already infected at t. This approach is
the most common in literature [14], [15], [16]. It can be used
directly, or if time stamps are available on nodes we can
simply consider ovt = 0 if t < tinf and ovt = 1 if t ≥ tinf ,
where tinf denotes the time stamp, e.g., the time at which a
node was infected. We can construct a series of observations
this way; in the worst case if every node has a different time
stamp |T | = |V (G)|.
The analysis in this paper is restricted to these two
observation cases.
3.2 Error function
The chosen error function should be able to compare obser-
vations made on the infection process. The observations are
a set of vectors with time stamps attached to each vector. We
can pair the vectors according to their time stamps, compute
the error and then aggregate the individual distances into a
single value.
If the observations are vectors containing real numbers,
a form of vector distance should be a natural choice. For
the continuous valued observation type presented in the
previous subsection we use the root mean squared error
(RMSE) function to compare the individual observation
vectors. For binary observations ROC evaluation is used in
similar fashion.
3.3 Computation
The GIIM defines a general optimization task, which can be
solved with the iterative refinement of an initial edge weight
configuration. The number of edges even in a medium sized
graph can be in the tens or hundreds of thousands, so find-
ing the proper combination of weights can be challenging,
therefore choosing an appropriate optimization method is
crucial. Here we a recommend and use the Fully Informed
Particle Swarm method of Kennedy and Mendes [20], [21],
which has proved successful in previous inverse infection
tasks [3].
The optimization task was defined at the beginning of
Section 3 as the minimization of the error between com-
puted and reference observations. The method is initialized
with randomly selected edge infection values within rea-
sonable bounds, then a simulation of the infection process
is computed to create observations. The error between the
reference and computed observations is counted and used
to adjust the edge infection values. The process is then
repeated.
The search strategy is Particle Swarm Optimization: an
iterative multi-agent non-gradient metaheuristic. Each agent
has a position that represents an edge weight configuration,
and the agents refine their position by interacting with their
neighbors. This is done by adding the velocity of the agent
to the position of the agent. The velocity of the agent is
computed from its previous value, the best result found
by the agent and its neighbors and a random vector. The
goodness of an agent is the goodness of the edge weight
configuration it represents, and the goodness is evaluated
by running an infection model and computing the error
of the resulting observations. The agents are connected to
each other through a pre-defined topology describing the
neighborhood of each agent.
The specifics of the update rules for the positions and
velocities as well as the agent topology are not fixed, there
are several approaches in the literature. Here, like in [6], we
follow the recommendations of Kennedy and Mendes [21]
by adopting a von Neumann neighborhood for the agents
and the following update rules:
~vi ← χ
(
~vi +
Ni∑
n=1
U(0, ϕ)(~bnbr(n) − ~xi)
Ni
)
, (1)
~xi ← ~xi + ~vi, (2)
where ~xi and ~vi denotes the coordinate and velocity of parti-
cle i, U(min,max) is a uniform random number generator,
~bi is the best location found so far by particle i, Ni is the
number of neighbors i has and nbr(n) is the nth neighbor
of i. The formula has two parameters: χ is the constriction
coefficient and ϕ is the acceleration constant. Again, we use
the recommendations of Kennedy et al., and set χ = 0.7298
and ϕ = 4.1.
At the beginning, the position of the agents is initialized
with random values, and the velocities are set to zero. Then
at the end of each iteration the positions and velocities are
updated synchronously according to the above equations.
The search is stopped if the method does not find a better
global result in a set number of iterations. Algorithm 2 gives
an outline of PSO.
The above algorithm can be implemented in a parallel
way. Since the positions and velocities of each agent are
updated at the end of each iteration, the goodness of the
5Algorithm 2 Particle Swarm Optimization
1: for all ai do
2: Initialize ~xi for agent ai within the boundaries of the
search space
3: Initialize ~vi for agent ai
4: Set ~bi ← ~xi
5: Select the neighbors of ai according to the topology
6: end for
7: repeat
8: for all ai do
9: Update ~vi according to equation 2
10: Update ~xi according to equation 3
11: Calculate the error function e(~xi) in position ~xi
12: if e(~xi) < e(~bi) then
13: ~bi ← ~xi
14: end if
15: end for
16: until termination criterium is met
current position of each agent can be computed indepen-
dently and simultaneously on multiple threads. This way
the running time of the algorithm can be decreased signifi-
cantly in multi-core processors.
3.4 IIP as a special case of GIIM
The Inverse Infection Problem (IIP) as appeared in [5], [6]
can be considered the predecessor of GIIM. GIIM uses the
same FPSO optimization method as IIP, and the RMSE
error function is one method used to guide the search in
both models. However, compared with GIIM, the IIP is
much more limited in terms of scope. In GIIM a range of
observation levels can be accommodated, thus the error
function has to be extended to account for multiple real
vectors. Additionally, IIP fixes the number of observations
to two: the a priori observation at time point zero, and the a
posteriori observation after the infection process concludes.
The nature of the observation is also fixed: IIP uses real
infection values for the nodes: the probabilities of infection
before and after the infection process. The IIP is also only
applicable for one type of infection model, the Generalized
Cascade Model [4], which is a variant of the IC model. In
contrast, GIIM handles an arbitrary number of observations,
does not constrain the type of these observations, and does
not specify the used infection model.
4 EVALUATION
The GIIM was designed to be a versatile tool, that is easy to
adapt to real-life problems. As we have seen in the previous
section it offers flexibility in terms of input data (number
and type of observations), error function and infection
model. Investigating all possible combinations of these is
beyond the scope of this paper, instead here we focus on
properties best tested on artificial infection scenarios. We
measure the difficulty of a variety of inverse infection tasks
in terms of the accuracy and the speed of the estimation.
The tasks vary based on the number and type of available
observations, the infection model and the prevalence of
infections in the graph. A more detailed description of the
tasks is provided in Section 4.3.
We present the evaluation in three parts. Section 4.2
focuses on the feasibility of the estimation on simple graph
classes, namely trees and directed acyclic graphs. We point
out some trivial and non-trivial properties of the problem. In
Section 4.3 we test the general applicability of the method on
complex networks. Here we consider a number of infection
scenarios with different transmission probabilities between
nodes, prevalence of initial infections, infection models and
their parameters. We also examine how the number of
available observations affect the quality of the estimations.
In Section 4.4 we consider the scalability of the method on
large networks and the stability of the optimization method.
4.1 Method details and experiment setup
The inverse infection tasks in this paper are constructed ac-
cording to the following procedure.
1) For a given graph, reference edge weights and the
initially infected vertices are selected. The reference
edge weights are not used in the inverse infection
model, so they are omitted afterwards.
2) An infection model is selected and simulated using
a modified version of CompleteSim published in [4].
The original method computes two observations for
the IC model, but it is easy to adapt it to other mod-
els. The set of infection models considered includes:
a) The Independent Cascade Model (SIR with
τi = 1).
b) The SIR model with τi infectious period.
c) The SEIR model with τe latency and τi infec-
tious period.
d) The SI model.
3) During the simulation process, the set of reference
observations for all nodes is computed. The obser-
vations are taken at the following time steps:
a) Two observations are available at t0 = i0 and
t1 = tmax = imax.
b) Observations for all iterations of the discrete
infection process are available T : {t0 =
i0, . . . , tmax = imax}.
4) Observations may be in the following form:
a) ovt = pvt , t ∈ T for all v ∈ V (G), that
is real infection values for all vertices of the
graph denoting the probability of infection
up to time step t. T may contain an arbitrary
number of observations with respect to the
restrictions in section 3.1.
b) ovt = bvt , t ∈ T for all v ∈ V (G), that is
binary flags for all nodes of the graph signal-
ing that the node was in an infectious state
at time step t. T may contain an arbitrary
number of observations with respect to the
restrictions in section 3.1.
5) An error function is attached to the task.
a) The RMSE function averaged over all real-
valued observations.
b) The ROC AUC value for the last observation
with binary observations.
66) The Particle Swarm Optimization method computes
the estimated edge infection probabilities and ob-
servations. The method is used with the number
of agents ranging from 100 to 250 depending on
the size of the task. The method is stopped if it
does not find a better solution in 50 iterations. We
experimented with other settings and found, that
the accuracy of the method cannot be improved
significantly by increasing the PSO parameters.
The final error value measures the goodness of the
estimation. This procedure is repeated for a range of graph
classes, sizes and infection scenarios.
4.2 Acyclic examples
We examine two specific graph classes in this section: trees
and directed acyclic graphs to highlight certain non-trivial
properties of the problem, but it is worth noting that fully
observed finite infection processes (with time stamps for
each node) can be naturally represented as DAG-s. Our goal
here is to find out how difficult it is to compute inverse
infection tasks for these seemingly simple graph classes.
4.2.1 Underdetermination
A significant challenge exists in the estimation of edge
infection values, which is illustrated using the following
small example. Consider the example network in Figure
1/a. There are two vertices, A and B, connected by a directed
edge pointing from A to B. A and B are infected in succeed-
ing iterations, A in t = 0 and B in t = 1, therefore both have
an observed binary flag of one. For the sake of simplicity we
consider the IC infection model. The best and optimal way
to explain this scenario is to consider the connecting edge
to have an infection probability of one. This is obviously
an artifact rising from the available observations, a lack
of information since we have only one observation on a
highly stochastic process. From the optimization point of
view however this is an optimal solution to the scenario,
since this is the most likely explanation of the observations.
If we have real-valued observations on vertex A and B the
edge infection probability is the one satisfying the equation
pB = pA ∗ wAB . Next consider the case shown in Figure
1/b. There are now two possible sources of infection for B.
Vertex A and vertex C both have a directed edge pointing
towards B and both were infected in the iteration before B
was infected. Suppose that pA and pC are independent of
each other. Now pB = 1− ((1−pA ∗wAB)∗ (1−pC ∗wCB)).
If the edge infection probabilities are real there are many,
possibly infinite ways of explaining this event, and this
occurs at both binary flags and real pv-s. The challenge in
accurate edge weight estimation again arises from a lack
of information: we cannot decide the value of one edge
value without knowing the other. Similar phenomena can
be observed in the other infection models.
We will refer to the problems above as the underdeter-
mination of the inverse infection task. Underdetermination
occurs in most real-life examples, even when the infection
process is completely observable.
Fig. 1. Example of underdetermination. There is only one edge weight,
that explains the infection event on a), while b) is underdetermined.
TABLE 1
Averaged error of the optimization method on trees and directed
lattices of various sizes for the two-observation case. The graph class,
number of edges, the accuracy of the results (error at the end of the
optimization process) can be seen. Both binary and real-valued
observations were tested, with AUC and RMSE provided for the former,
only RMSE for the latter. Result are provided for the IC infection model.
Class Edges Binary Binary Real-valued
ROC AUC RMSE RMSE
Tree 31 1 0 0.0171
Tree 511 1 0 0.0269
Tree 2047 1 0 0.08
DAG 42 1 0 0.0262
DAG 420 1 0 0.0562
4.2.2 Trees and Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG-s)
We first evaluate the performance of GIIM with arbores-
cences. In these graphs the infection spreads from the root,
which is infected with probability of 1. Reference edge
values were drawn from a uniform distribution between 0
and 1. Since there is only one directed path from the source
of infection to each node, identifying the edge infection
probabilities corresponding to the task should be easy. We
consider both binary and real vertex infection values, for
three binary trees with heights four, eight and eleven and
two DAG-s with 42 and 420 edges.
First consider the task where we only have two observa-
tions on the infection process, one at the beginning t0 = i0
and one at the end t1 = tmax = imax of the process1.
The accuracy of the estimations are presented in Table 1.
The differences between infection models was minimal,
therefore results are only shown for the IC infection model.
When the observations are provided as binary flags the
optimization algorithm was always able to find an optimal
solution with RMSE = 0 and AUC = 1 much faster than
with the real valued solution. The reason for this is due to
the underdetermination explained in the previous section. If
the observations are vectors of ones and zeros, the best way
to explain the observations is to assign the edge values to be
ones and zeros. To further illustrate this concept, consider
the example shown in Figure 2. A leaf node in the tree has
an observed infection value of one if all the edges leading to
the leaf from the root have an edge infection value of one. If
a leaf node has a value of zero, at least one edge connecting
1. We only consider the IC, SIR and SEIR models in this section.
7Fig. 2. Example of underdetermination. A leaf node has an observed
infction value of one if and only if all the edges leading to it have edge
infection values of one. A leaf node has an observed infection value of
zero if at least one edge connecting the root to it has a value of zero.
it to the root must have a zero value. This constrains the
search to binary values as opposed to the continuous values
of the real-valued case. Even if the behavior of the infection
process is more complicated in DAG-s, i.e. there are more
explanations, this makes the binary inverse infection task
much easier.
Table 1 shows that in the two-observation real-valued
case the second DAG with 420 edges is more challenging
than the similar sized tree with 511 edges. This is because
in the trees there is only one path from the source of the
infection to each node, so there is only one way to explain
the process, while in the DAG-s multiple paths are present,
meaning there are multiple optima. The first problem is
therefore easier than the second, hence the difference in the
real-valued RMSE results in Table 1.
If the infection process is fully observed, i.e., infection
status at all timesteps is available, the error on all nodes
for each individual time step can be computed separately,
therefore it is possible to measure the performance of the
optimization method in each iteration of the infection pro-
cess. Figure 3 shows results for the fully observed case
for the second tree and the biggest DAG. Since the root
is the source of the infections and there are no directed
cycles, an observation at time step i defines the infection
values for nodes that are up to i distance from the root.
The error steadily increases as the infection reaches further
from the root: at the last observation the RMSE value is
significantly greater than the value measured at the two
information case. This increase in error is because the longer
the chain of infections leading to a node, the more difficult
it is to estimate its value. A possible reason for this is, the
error becomes ”spread out” equally among observations. In
other words, the first few time steps are easier to compute
because the nodes at a short distance from the root are far
less numerous than the ones farther away. Additionally, the
chain of edge infection values connecting them to the root is
shorter, so there are less values to estimate.
From the pure optimization perspective, the task is
somewhat difficult, since the number of parameters to
estimate – the number of edges – can be large. For the
real-valued scenarios presented the total error was always
below 9%, and significantly lower on the smaller examples.
For the binary case the method was able to find the best
solution every time. The PSO method required between 100
and 1500 iterations to find the above solutions, with the
larger graphs taking more time and iterations, but there
was minimal difference between the accuracy of the results,
further illustrating the stability of the chosen method. The
SIR and SEIR models took slightly more time to compute
than the IC due to the longer and more complex infection
process (non-zero τi and τe).
4.3 Complex networks
In addition to trees and DAG-s, we also examine the perfor-
mance of GIIM on a more general complex network struc-
ture, and under several different infection scenarios. The
graph in question is undirected and it has 250 nodes and 897
edges. The graph was created with the forest fire model in
[24]. The network itself is relatively small in network science
terms, but our task here is to find the correct value for each
edge, which is moderately challenging for the optimization
algorithm. We examine the scalability of the method in the
next section.
Our goal in this section is to compare the performance of
the method in terms of accuracy and running time under a
number of fundamentally different infection scenarios. The
scenarios differ according to the infection model, type and
number of observations, the fraction of initially infected
nodes and the size of the reference edge infection values.
The type and number of observations will be the same as
in the previous section. We measure RMSE on real-valued
observations and ROC AUC on binary ones, and consider
minimally and fully observed cases as defined in Section
4.1. The scenarios examined are summarized as follows:
• Four different infection models: IC, SI, SIR with τi =
2, SEIR with τe = 2 and τi = 3.
• Three sets of initially infected vertices: 33%, 10%
or 2% of the nodes are initially infected with the
infection probabilities ranging between 0 and 0.5 for
the real-valued case, and uniformly 1 for the binary
case.
• Three sets of reference edge infection values as de-
fined in Section 4.1. The values were drawn from an
uniform random distribution between 0 and 0.25, 0
and 0.5, 0 and 0.75 respectively.
If we only consider the infection scenarios we have 4∗3∗
3 = 36 tasks, and if we add the observation types this goes
up to 108. Each of these tasks was computed ten times and
the results were averaged. The standard deviation measured
between results was below 10% for all infection scenarios.
The RMSE and the AUC values are presented for the
real-valued and binary infection tasks, respectively, for the
two-observation case (t0 = i0, t1 = tmax = imax) in Table 2.
Results can be seen for all four of the infection models and
all possible initial infection states, and infection probability
combinations. In the first column, the first number denotes
the percentage of initially infected nodes, the second one the
maximum values of the edge infection probabilities. In the
8Fig. 3. The RMSE at different distances from the source in the fully observed IC model for a) the second DAG and b) the second tree in Table 1.
TABLE 2
Accuracy of the optimization method on complex networks for the two-observation case. RMSE is shown for the real-valued case, and AUC is
shown for the binary one. The numbers of the inverse infection tasks correspond to the scenarios described in this section. The first number
denotes the percentage of initially infected nodes, the second one the maximum values of the edge infection probabilities.
Task IC SIR 2 SEIR 2,3 SI
Init/Prob Real Binary Real Binary Real Binary Real Binary
33/0.75 0.024 1 0.019 1 0.016 1 0.018 1
33/0.50 0.040 1 0.033 1 0.03 1 0.02 1
33/0.25 0.079 1 0.041 1 0.13 1 0.05 1
10/0.75 0.024 1 0.022 1 0.015 1 0.016 1
10/0.50 0.054 1 0.053 1 0.043 1 0.027 1
10/0.25 0.14 0.99 0.068 1 0.17 1 0.086 1
2/0.75 0.023 1 0.0181 1 0.016 1 0.015 1
2/0.50 0.046 1 0.0355 1 0.0254 1 0.022 1
2/0.25 0.073 1 0.14 0.99 0.0812 1 0.055 1
SI model the second observation was selected so that the
estimated averaged node infection value at the observation
was close to the estimated averaged node infection value
at the last of observation of the SEIR model. As we saw
in the previous section, the binary tasks are much easier
to compute than the real-valued scenarios. Based on the
results in Table 2, the larger infections are easier to predict.
The reason for this is that the infection probability of a
node is bounded: no matter how dense the infections are,
the node infection probability cannot be greater than one.
This means, that if the infections are dense – either because
there are many initially infected nodes, or the edge infection
probabilities are large – a sizable fraction of the nodes are
going to have an infection value close to one. This makes
their distribution more homogeneous and this also makes
the optimization task easier, since there are less distinct
values to estimate.
The difference between the infection models is deceptive.
Since we are running the same infection tasks on the same
network with different infection models, if we increase the
infectious period we can expect greater prevalence of vertex
infections, therefore we are seeing the same phenomenon
as with the size of infections. To confirm this we have
shown the average infection probability of the nodes for the
different tasks in Table 3, and indeed they correlate strongly
with the error seen in Table 2.
Results for the fully observed real-valued scenarios are
shown in Figure 4. The error is computed on the observa-
tions at each time step, T : {1 . . . 10}, for the SIR model.
All infection scenarios were run for 10 iterations. The same
TABLE 3
Average node infection value for the last observation for all infection
models. As before, the numbers of the inverse infection tasks
correspond to the scenarios described in this section. The first number
denotes the percentage of initially infected nodes, the second one the
maximum values of the edge infection probabilities.
Task IC SIR 2 SEIR 2,3 SI
Init/Prob
33/0.75 0.78 0.87 0.91 0.9
33/0.50 0.65 0.8 0.86 0.88
33/0.25 0.46 0.65 0.72 0.72
10/0.75 0.69 0.83 0.88 0.85
10/0.50 0.51 0.72 0.8 0.79
10/0.25 0.22 0.46 0.6 0.56
2/0.75 0.68 0.82 0.88 0.85
2/0.50 0.50 0.72 0.8 0.79
2/0.25 0.20 0.45 0.6 0.56
performance behavior was observed for the other infection
models, and they are, therefore, not presented separately.
Figure 4 illustrates the significant difference in the behav-
ior of the inverse infection tasks with sparse and dense
infections. When the infections are large, in the first few
observations the error increases, then steadily decreases to
its final value. With sparse infections the situation is more
similar to what we observed in trees; the error continuously
increases until the end of the infection process. The tasks
with dense initial infections and sparse infection spreading
behaves somewhat like a combination of the two. The
explanation behind this behavior is the following. If the
initially infected nodes are far apart from each other, the
9Fig. 4. RMSE at different time steps of the infection process for the fully observed scenario in the SIR model. The error is shown on the observations
at T : {1 . . . 10}
first few steps of the process behave very much like what
we have seen on the trees of the previous section, and the
reasoning remains the same. Furthermore, if the infection
probabilities are small, the infections stay local, centered
around the initially infected nodes. However, if the infec-
tions originating from multiple sources reach each other,
the probability of being infected rises significantly due to
multiple independent infection paths connecting each node.
However, if the infections are dense enough, again a sizable
fraction of the nodes will have an infection value close to
one, making the optimization task easier, and explaining
the improvement in model performance seen on Figure 4
for more aggressive infection processes.
Finally, from the optimization perspective the task is
moderately difficult for the FPSO algorithm. The perfor-
mance varies depending on the task: the binary ones are
easy, always taking less than two hundred iterations to
conclude, while the real-valued scenarios with sparse infec-
tion are the most difficult often requiring over a thousand
iterations. The accuracy of the predictions is acceptable;
for the majority of the test runs the error stays below 5%,
but there are cases where the search is less successful, for
example the 10/0.25 scenario for the IC model. Nonetheless
we can conclude the the optimization method performs well
in this application.
4.4 Scalability
We close the evaluation by investigating the scalability of
the optimization method. Our interests here are the average
number of iterations the method requires to produce a solu-
tion, the total running time2, and the relationship between
the size of the task and the accuracy of the estimation.
We examine four graphs in this section with
1000, . . . , 4000 nodes and 1754, 3752, 5700, 7753 edges and
2. A parallel version of the algorithm was implemented in C++, and
the results were computed on a PC with an 4-core i7-4770 3.4 GHz
processor.
four infection scenarios from the previous section: 33% or
10% of the nodes are initially infected with the infection
probability between 0 and 0.5 for the real-valued case and
uniformly 1 for the binary case. Reference edge infection
values were drawn from an uniform random distribution
between 0 and 0.25, 0 and 0.75 respectively. Both binary and
real-valued two-observation infection scenarios are inves-
tigated. We only show results for the SIR τi = 2 model,
the performance of the other models was similar. Each of
these tasks was computed ten times and the results were
averaged. The variance of the results was minimal.
Figure 5 shows the accuracy of the estimations, the
averaged number of iterations and running time for the
above infection scenarios. The binary tasks remain much
easier to solve than the real-valued tasks, requiring fewer
iterations and less computational time to find a good estima-
tion. The difference between the infection scenarios is also
similar to that observed in the smaller examples, with larger
infections being easier to predict. Although, this depends on
the ability of the graph to transfer infections (the reference
edge values), as opposed to the fraction of initially infected
vertices.
Accuracy scaling can be seen on Figures 5/a and 5/b.
The error of the estimation increases with the number of
estimated values (edges), although the increase is signifi-
cantly lower if the reference edge values are large. RMSE
error values stay below 0.09 for all graphs if edge infections
are large, but they are greater than 0.1 if infection values are
small. Similar behavior can be observed in the binary case,
where the classification is perfect if the transfer probabilities
are large, but stays below 1 if the edge values are small.
The difference between scenarios with large and small edge
infection probabilities can also be seen on Figures 5/c and
5/d, where the number of iterations required to find a good
solution is much smaller if edge infection values are large.
Finally, the running time of the tasks in minutes can be seen
on Figures 5/e and 5/f. Depending on the size of the graph
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Fig. 5. Scalability results for the two-obervation infection scenarios on four graphs. Both binary and real-valued cases are shown. RMSE and ROC
AUC values can be seen on a) and b), average number of iterations on c) and d), and the averaged total running time in minutes on e) and f).
and the edge infection values the tasks took one to eight
hours in average to compute on the computer listed above.
Directly estimating the edge infection values in GIIM is
a difficult task, since the number of values to estimate i.e.
the number of edges, can be large even for medium sized
graphs, posing a challenge for the optimization algorithm.
In this section we considered graphs up to 4000 nodes and
7753 edges, and seen that the estimation is possible on an
average PC with acceptable accuracy and running time.
There are multiple ways to speed up the method so that
it can handle large networks. The time complexity of the
optimization depends heavily on the time complexity of the
infection model. A modified version of the CompleteSim
infection heuristic [4] was used in this paper, but other
potentially faster heuristics are available in the literature [4],
[7]. Another way to considerably speed up estimations is to
assume that the edge infection values can be computed as
functions of known vertex or edge attributes. In this case
only the coefficients of these functions have to be estimated,
which are far less numerous than the number of edges in
the graph.
5 FUTURE WORKS
The scope of this paper allows us to test only part of the
functionality provided by the Generalized Inverse Infection
Model. In the previous sections we presented the behavior
of GIIM with respect to the number of type of available
observations, infection model and the specific infection sce-
nario. However, there are many additional applications and
extensions of the proposed model. Certain extensions are
discussed below, and will be explored in future works.
5.1 Function estimation
The task of GIIM is to find an edge weight assignment that
minimizes the difference between the reference and com-
puted infections. This requires finding the edge infection
probability for all edges of the graph. Optimizing for this
many values, while possible as we have seen in Section 4, is
difficult even for medium sized graphs.
Another approach to direct edge weight estimation is
to compute the edge weights as a function of existing
attributes as seen in [3], [6], [12]. These works assume
that additional information can be assigned to the edges
or vertices of the graph. Examples include the number of
passengers or travel distance in an air traffic network [12],
and the amount or frequency of transactions in [3]. The
edge infection probabilities themselves can be defined as
functions of these attributes, in which case the optimization
task changes to finding the proper function formulation
explaining the reference infection process. This approach is
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often an easier estimation task compared with finding all of
the edge weights.
It is possible to extend the notion of formulating edge
infection values as functions of edge attributes to vertices.
If observations are available on nodes that relate to the
infection process it is possible to define a function that
computes a single infection value for the node. Then these
values can be used as observations. The values might be
normalized between zero and one, although it is important
to note that these are generally not probability values.
5.2 Time scale of the infection process
So far we have assumed that the sample times of the
reference and computed observations are the same: T = T ′
in O = Inf(G,W, I, T ), O′ = Inf(G,W ′, I, T ′). This is
usually not realistic, since many times we cannot freely pick
the exact moment the observations are made or the amount
of observations. Real-life sample times are continuous, for
example, dates or clock time. Therefore, matching them to
the sample times of the simulated observation process may
be non-trivial especially if they are noisy as well. Addi-
tionally, infections in the real world might not behave the
way we expect them to. They can be influenced by factors
unknown to the observer, suddenly become more virulent
or stop for no apparent reason: the time scale of the infection
process might be unknown. The relationship between the
timescale of the observed and computed processes might
not be linear or not even monotonic. Therefore, matching the
observations on an artificially simulated infection process to
real-life observations might be a difficult task.
5.3 Identifying and calibrating the infection model
Another point of interest is the epidemic model. In some
real-life applications it is fairly possible that 1, the infection
model is unknown 2, the parameters of the infection model
are unknown. In the first case it might be worthwhile to start
with a more general model and move to more specific ones.
The second case is simpler, instead of looking forW ′ inO′ =
Inf(G,W ′, I(θ′), T ′) we are looking for θ′ or possibly both,
where θ′ denotes the parameters of the infection function.
If the edge weights are unknown, this might be a difficult
task, since we are optimizing for both W ′ and θ′.
5.4 Planned application
The next phase of this research will be the application
of the GIIM to a global epidemic. Observing the spread
of infectious diseases is not an easy task. However, there
are examples of well-documented outbreaks. Specifically,
the estimated number of infections over time in either a
given city, region and country are increasingly available for
large scale outbreaks. For international outbreaks, where the
transfer method between the countries can be attributed to
a specific medium: air or maritime transportation, the GIIM
can be applied to estimate the risk of disease spread between
regions, via specific travel routes. This type of analysis can
aid in both prediction, prevention and disease control, and
will be explored in the context of the 2015 Zika pandemic in
future work.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we proposed the Generalized Inverse Infection
Model with the intention of providing a general framework
to describe inverse infection tasks. Given an unweighted
graph and a set of observations on an infection process GIIM
is able to estimate the edge infection probabilities explaining
the input observations. Contrary to existing models our
model is able to handle an arbitrary number of these; it
can be applied to fully, minimally or potentially partially
observed infection processes. The nature of the observations
is not fixed; in the scope of this paper we experimented
with binary and real node infection values but it is possible
to use other values tied to the spread of the infection process
within the framework. The underlying infection model may
also be customized: we worked with the SI, IC, SIR and
SEIR models but it is also possible to consider other network
based models. GIIM formulates the inverse infection task as
a general optimization problem and a Particle Swarm Op-
timization method was suggested as the solution method.
Finally, it is possible to further extend the functionality
introduced in this paper, like estimating functions on the
edges instead of probability values or estimating the pa-
rameters of the infection model. Additional suggestions can
be found in Section 5.
We evaluated the performance of GIIM on a high variety
of artificial infection scenarios. Our goal was to investigate
the relationship between the parameters of the infection
scenario and the difficulty of the edge estimation. We have
shown on trees that even though the problem is underdeter-
mined it is possible to find reasonably accurate explanations
of the infection process. On more general complex networks
we examined the behavior of our method on 108 different
inverse infection tasks. The tasks varied according to the
epidemic model, the density of initial infections, the refer-
ence edge infection probabilities and the type and number
of observations. Our findings indicate, that there is close
relationship between the expected size of the infection and
difficulty of the task, with larger infections being easier
to predict. There is complex interplay between density of
initial infections, the likelihood of the infection spread and
the difficulty of the estimation at different time steps. We
can also conclude that even though (or perhaps because
of) binary tasks are more underdetermined, they are much
more easy to predict. Finally we have experimented with
larger networks and a few specific infection scenarios to
investigate the scalability of the problem. We can say, that
the optimization method performs well for almost all of the
situations described in this paper.
The framework of GIIM allows the estimation of edge
infection probabilities in scenarios different from the ones
we have seen in the evaluations section. We provided a
couple of suggestions to further improve the functionality
described in this paper as well as a planned application.
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